How Reasonable Is a Warrantless Protective Sweep? And How a Limited Search is Better for Society as a Whole by Sotiropoulos, Jamie
Journal of Public Law and Policy
Volume 37 | Issue 1 Article 5
2017
How Reasonable Is a Warrantless Protective
Sweep? And How a Limited Search is Better for
Society as a Whole
Jamie Sotiropoulos
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/jplp
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Hamline. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Journal of Public Law and Policy by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@Hamline. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@hamline.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sotiropoulos, Jamie (2017) "How Reasonable Is a Warrantless Protective Sweep? And How a Limited Search is Better for Society as a
Whole," Journal of Public Law and Policy: Vol. 37: Iss. 1, Article 5.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/jplp/vol37/iss1/5
Mitchell Hamline Law Journal of Public Policy and 
Practice 
 
 
Volume 37 | Issue 1              Article 5 
 
 
 
2016 
 
How Reasonable Is a Warrantless Protective Sweep? And How 
a Limited Search is Better for Society as a Whole 
 
Jamie Sotiropoulos 
Mitchell Hamline School of Law 
 
 
 
 
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/jplp 
Part of the International Law Commons, Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons, 
and the Sexuality and the Law Commons. 
 
Recommended Citation 
Sotiropoulos, Jamie  (2016) “How Reasonable Is a Warrantless Protective Sweep? And How a 
Limited Search is Better for Society as a Whole,” Mitchell Hamline Law Journal of Public 
Policy and Practice: Vol. 37: Iss. 1, Article 5. 
Available at: http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/jplp/vol36/iss1/5  
 
 
This article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@Hamline. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in the Mitchell Hamline Law Journal of Public Policy and Practice 
by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Hamline. For more information, please 
contact Benjamin.Lacy@mitchellhamline.edu. 
HOW REASONABLE IS A WARRANTLESS PROTECTIVE 
SWEEP? AND HOW A LIMITED SEARCH IS BETTER FOR 
SOCIETY AS A WHOLE 
 
Jamie Sotiropoulos 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
  As the police officer obtained consent to enter the house and began 
talking with the home owner, the police officer states that he heard a thump 
upstairs as if somebody else is in the house. He subsequently decided to go 
upstairs to investigate what the noise was for the safety of himself and the 
homeowner. On the way upstairs, he noticed through an open door way a bag of 
marijuana sitting on a desk. Consequently, the officer arrested the homeowner for 
possession of marijuana.  
 Cases like this fact situation happen frequently. When a homeowner gives 
consent to an officer to come into the house for something as simple as a question, 
and the officer subsequently finds an illegal object as he searches the entire house 
because the officer believed they were in risk of danger. This type of search is 
considered to be a warrantless protective sweep. A warrantless protective sweep is 
a limited search of a premise incident to an in-home arrest.
1
 These sweeps, 
however, are also conducted by police officers when an in-home arrest has not 
occurred. For example, officers may conduct a sweep of the house with the 
consent of the owner, or when they arrest someone outside of the home and then 
conduct a sweep inside. In the past few years, the courts have gone back and forth 
                                                 
1
 Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Construction and Application by State Courts of Protective Sweep 
Doctrine Recognized in Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276 
(1990)--Warrantless Search of House for Dangerous Persons, 78 A.L.R. 6th 297. 
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on defining what a warrantless protective sweep is. The courts base their 
arguments off of the definition of a protective sweep established in the United 
States Supreme Court case of Maryland v. Buie. The Buie court held that, “[a] 
‘protective sweep’ is a quick and limited search of premises, incident to an arrest 
and conducted to protect the safety of police officers or others.”2 While 
warrantless protective sweeps can create many issues concerning consent, 
knowledge, and reasonableness, this article will discuss the background of 
warrantless protective sweeps with regards to the change in definition and 
application. Next, it will explain how warrants protect one’s personal right to 
privacy, and finally, it will discuss how a limited search for a warrantless 
protective sweep, based off of the definition found in the Buie case, is better for 
society as a whole.   
II. BACKGROUND 
a. Right to Privacy  
 The Fourth Amendment states:  
 “ [t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects,  against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no warrants shall  issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly  describing the  place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized.”3 
    
 The Fourth Amendment protects people where they have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, and therefore they are entitled to be free from 
                                                 
2
 See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 327, 327 (1990); See also Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, 
Construction and Application by State Courts of Protective Sweep Doctrine Recognized in 
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276 (1990)--Warrantless Search of 
House for Dangerous Persons, 78 A.L.R. 6th 297. 
3
 U.S. Const. amend. IV.  
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unreasonable governmental intrusions.
4
 Unreasonable governmental intrusions 
and an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy are measured based upon an 
individual’s privacy interest and the promotion of legitimate governmental 
interests.
5
 The reasonableness requirement has been established through case law 
such as the balancing analysis established in Terry v. Ohio. In Terry, the court 
held that when the totality of circumstances gave an officer the ability to articulate 
specific facts that lead to reasonable inferences the officer could be at risk of 
serious danger, then the officer may frisk the person for weapons.
6
 Like Terry, the 
court in Mich. v. Long, also held that police officers can do protective searches 
when they have a reasonable belief that the suspect poses a danger and danger 
may arise from the possible presence of weapons in the area surrounding the 
suspect.
7
 The exception of the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment 
with warrantless protective sweeps is repeatedly held to be constitutional through 
case law and secondary materials.  
  Additionally, the Fourth Amendment protects individuals by requiring a 
warrant to be issued when police officers want to search or seize items, or 
people.
8
 The Fourth Amendment protects individuals by requiring police officers 
to have a warrant, and if they do not have a warrant and conduct the search or 
seizure anyway, then the police officers must fulfill an exception to the warrant 
requirement, such as having probable cause that there is an illegal item or activity 
                                                 
4
 See Cucuta v. New York City, 25 F. Supp.3d  404, 410 (S.D.N.Y 2014).  
5
 Id.  
6
 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 4, 27 (1968). 
7
 Mich. v. Long, 463 U.S. 1034, 1050 (1983).  
8
 See Sherry F. Colb, Article: The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment 
“Reasonableness”, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1642, 1648 (1998). 
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happening, or that the police officers must conduct a protective sweep for their or 
others safety.
9
 The courts especially believe that there must be an exception to the 
warrant requirement when a search or seizure is conducted inside a home without 
a warrant.
10
 This is because the courts and society find that a home is where 
people have the highest expectation for privacy and there is no other place in 
society with this expectation.
11
 Therefore, privacy in a home is a basic principle 
of Fourth Amendment law and if these searches and seizures in homes do not 
have warrants, then they are considered to be unreasonable.
12
 So, if evidence is 
obtained through unreasonable searches and seizures then it is inadmissible in 
state and federal criminal trials.
13
 However, there are exceptions to the warrant 
requirement in searching the home.
14
 This is because of the doctrine of 
reasonableness that is implemented in the Fourth Amendment.
15
 These exceptions 
to the warrant requirement could be for allowing the officers to conduct searches 
or seizures in a home when, “the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law 
enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable 
                                                 
9
 Id.  
10
 See Bringham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S 400, 403 (2006).  
11
 Id. See also Daniel D. Schick, Recent Decision: Constitutional Law-Unlawful Searches - When 
the Police Investigate a Home Using a Drug-Sniffing Dog it is a Physically Intrusive “Search” 
within the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 83 Miss. L.J. 427, 442 (2014). 
12
 See Bringham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S 400, 403 (2006); See also Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 553, 
559 (2004); and Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Construction and Application by State Courts of 
Protective Sweep Doctrine Recognized in Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 108 L. 
Ed. 2d 276 (1990)--Warrantless Search of House for Dangerous Persons, 78 A.L.R. 6th 297. 
13
 See S. R. ShapiroS. R. Shapiro, Annotation, Violation of Federal Constitutional Rule (Mapp v. 
Ohio) Excluding Evidence Obtained Through Unreasonable Search or Seizure, as Constituting 
Reversible or Harmless Error Violation of Federal Constitutional Rule (Mapp v. Ohio) Excluding 
Evidence Obtained Through Unreasonable Search or Seizure, as Constituting Reversible or 
Harmless Error, 30 A.L.R.3d 128. 
14
 See Bringham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S 400, 403 (2006). 
15
 Id. 
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under the Fourth Amendment.”16 For example, in Mincey v. Arizona, police 
officers conducted a warrantless search of an apartment because there was a 
homicide.
17
 The court concluded that a homicide presents an emergency situation 
demanding immediate action in order to see if there are other victims or to see if 
the killer is still within the premises.
18
 Emergency situations usually are always an 
exception to the Fourth Amendment, because it is reasonable for the police to 
protect human life or substantial property interests.
19
 However, in Mincey, the 
police officers conducted a four day warrantless sweep and therefore, the court 
found that a four day warrantless sweep was objectively unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment.
20
 Thus, in this case the police officers should have obtained a 
warrant to search dresser drawers, carpets, and the like.
21
 Another example where 
police officers conduct a warrantless search of a home is during a protective 
sweep. In these cases, the police officer feels that they or others on scene will be 
harmed by third parties who are within the house. Again, a protective sweep is not 
an extensive search as a search done with a warrant.
22
  
b. How Warrants Protect A Right to Privacy 
 Warrants are essential to the right to privacy because they are established 
through an objective standard.
23
 This allows a neutral party, the magistrate, to 
                                                 
16
 Id. 
17
 See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 387, 392 (1978). 
18
 Id. 
19
 John F. Decker, Article: Emergency Circumstances, Police Responses, and Fourth Amendment 
Restrictions, 89 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 434, 444 (1999). 
20
 See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 387, 393 (1978). 
21
 Id.  
22
 See Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Construction and Application by State Courts of Protective 
Sweep Doctrine Recognized in Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276 
(1990)--Warrantless Search of House for Dangerous Persons, 78 A.L.R. 6th 297. 
23
 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 4, 21 (1968). 
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judge the reasonableness of a search or seizure in light of the particular 
circumstances within the situation at hand.
24
 For an officer to obtain a warrant, the 
officer must show that there is a justified belief for having probable cause.
25
 
“Officers must support this showing with sworn statements (affidavits), and must 
describe in particularity the place they will search and the items they will seize.”26 
The magistrate would determine the facts presented to them and see if a man of 
reasonable caution would think that the search or seizure that might be taken is 
appropriate.
27
  
 An invasion of privacy, however, can be conducted without a warrant 
through exceptions established in case law to the Fourth Amendment.
28
 One 
exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment found by the 
United States Supreme Court is a warrantless protective sweep.  A warrantless 
protective sweep is “a quick and limited search of premises, incident to an arrest 
and conducted to protect the safety of police officers or others.”29 This exception 
was found constitutional under the Fourth Amendment through reasoning laid out 
in the 1968 case of Terry v. Ohio.
30
 In Terry, the United States Supreme Court 
held that,  
 “where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him 
reasonably to conclude  in light of his experience that criminal activity may 
be afoot and that the persons with  whom he is dealing may be armed and 
presently dangerous, where in the course of  investigating this behavior he 
identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable  inquiries, and were 
                                                 
24
 Id. 
25
 See Unreasonable Search and Seizure, Cornell University Law School (Sep. 12, 2015), available 
at https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/unreasonable_search_and_seizure. 
26
 Id. 
27 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 4, 22 (1968). 
28
 See United States v. Fadul, 16 F. Supp. 3d 271, 280 (S.D.N.Y 2014).  
29
 See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 327, 327 (1990). 
30
 Id. 
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nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear 
for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others 
in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such 
persons in an attempt to discover weapons seized may properly be introduced in 
evidence against the person from whom they were taken.”31  
 
 From this reasoning the court found that a warrantless protective sweep is 
permitted “if the searching officer possess[es] a reasonable belief based on 
specific and articulable facts which reasonably warranted the officer in believing 
that the area swept harbored an individual posing a danger to the officer or 
others.”32 Therefore, warrantless protective sweeps are an exception to the 
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
33
 As established above, the 
warrantless protective sweep is not an extensive search.
34
 During a warrantless 
protective sweep if police officers find illegal activities or items, then they can use 
the “plain view” doctrine to obtain the evidence.35  
 The “plain view” doctrine is another exception to the warrant requirement 
established in the Fourth Amendment.
36
 The “plain view” doctrine allows an 
officer to seize an item in plain view where the officer has a lawful right, such as 
a warrant or permission to be in a home, and to access the illegal object(s).
37
 
However, the object’s incriminating character must be immediately apparent to 
                                                 
31
 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 4, 30-1 (1968).  
32
 See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 327, 327 (1990). 
33
 Minnesota criminal law also agrees that protective sweeps are an exception to the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment;“Law enforcement officers may conduct, as a 
precautionary measure, protective sweep searches of areas immediately adjoining the place of 
arrest without probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe criminal conduct is occurring.” 11 
Dunnell Minn. Digest CRIMINAL LAW § 4.01 
34
 See Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Construction and Application by State Courts of Protective 
Sweep Doctrine Recognized in Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276 
(1990)--Warrantless Search of House for Dangerous Persons, 78 A.L.R. 6th 297. 
35
 See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 327, 331 (1990).  
36
 See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 130, 137 (1990). 
37
 Id.  
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the police officer.
38
 To be immediately apparent, the police officer must have 
immediately recognized the incriminating character of the object and understand 
that the object could be used as evidence against the accused.
39
 Therefore, a bag 
of marijuana sitting on a table where police are conducting a search warrant for a 
gun is in plain view since the officers had a legal right to be in the home and the 
object, the marijuana, is readily viewable and it is immediately apparent that it is 
an illegal substance or a crime.
40
 However, the Supreme Court has not found a 
plain view exception when a police officer finds a stolen stereo in a home, 
because it is not immediately apparent that the stereo was stolen, since the officer 
would have to lift up every stereo in the house to read the serial number and to see 
if that stereo was stolen.
41
   
III. WARRANTLESS PROTECTIVE SWEEPS  
a. The Definition of Protective Sweeps Changing with Time 
 Warrantless protective sweeps were established as an exception to the 
warrant requirement in the case of Maryland v. Buie in 1990.
42
 The Supreme 
Court held that, “[a] ‘protective sweep’ is a quick and limited search of premises, 
incident to an arrest and conducted to protect the safety of police officers or 
others.”43 The Buie court when on to define the protective sweep as “a cursory 
visual inspection of those places in which a person might be hiding and may last 
no longer than is necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger, in any 
                                                 
38
 Id.  
39
 See Coolidge v. N.H., 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971). 
40
 See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 323, 325-26 (1987). 
41
 Id.  
42
 See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 327, 327 (1990).  
43
 Id. 
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event no longer than it takes to complete the arrest and depart the premises.”44 To 
determine if a police officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct a warrantless 
protective sweep, the courts look at the type of offense that is suspected and the 
officers’ experience with that type of offense.45 However, reasonable suspicion is 
not needed within the arrestee’s immediate grab area this is due to the fact that 
police officers want themselves and others on the arrest site to be free from the 
danger of the arrestee using weapons against them, and so the police officers can 
obtain those weapons or items as evidence against the accused.
46
 The Buie court 
also held that officers may search spaces where a person could be hidden, as long 
as it was a search-incident-to-arrest, and if not, then a search that includes places 
where a person can be hidden is not allowed during a warrantless protective 
sweep.
47
 Still, courts are debating the issue on what a protective sweep is with 
regards to what exactly is a quick and limited search.
48
  
                                                 
44
 Again, the police officers must have a reasonable suspicion or belief that the area might harbor 
third parties that may pose a danger to the officers or others on the arrest scene. See Ann K. 
Wooster, Annotation, Construction and Application by State Courts of Protective Sweep Doctrine 
Recognized in Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276 (1990)--
Warrantless Search of House for Dangerous Persons, 78 A.L.R. 6th 297. 
45
 See Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Construction and Application by State Courts of Protective 
Sweep Doctrine Recognized in Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276 
(1990)--Warrantless Search of House for Dangerous Persons, 78 A.L.R. 6th 297. 
46
 See State v. McGrane, 733 N.W.2d 671, 678 (Iowa 2007). 
47
See State v. McGrane, 733 N.W.2d 671, 678 (Iowa 2007).  
 
This idea established by Buie, with concerns to searching for third parties when there is an arrest, 
has been affirmed by the Northern District of Illinois, the Court of Appeals of Missouri, and by the 
Eastern District of Tennessee. See Rusinowski v. Village of Hillside, 19 F. Supp. 3d 798 (N.D. Ill. 
2014); State v. Cromer, 186 S.W.3d 333 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 2005); and U.S. v. Gregg, 30 F. 
Supp. 3d 704 (E.D. Tenn. 2014). However, the Court of Appeals of Idaho, the Court of Appeals of 
Kentucky, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, the Court of Appeals of Texas, and the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit narrowed the idea further stating that even if there was an 
arrest, a reasonably prudent officer must be able to point to articulable facts based on the officer’s 
knowledge and experience to support their belief that others may be on the premises after effecting 
an arrest or detention at a house. See State v. Slater, 133 Idaho 882, 994 P.2d 625 (Ct. App. 1999); 
Brown v. Com., 423 S.W.3d 765 (Ky. Ct. App. 2014); State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 95 A.3d 188 
(2014); Sayers v. State, 433 S.W.3d 667 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 2014); and U.S. v. Aguilar, 
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 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that 
law enforcement officers may not enter a defendant’s home to perform a 
protective sweep when the defendant is arrested outside of that home, unless there 
are “articulable facts which warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that 
the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest 
scene.”49 An example of a police officer having articulable and reasonable facts to 
conduct a warrantless protective sweep inside the home when they arrested a 
person outside of the home is when, the police officer knows that the arrestee 
habitually pursues criminal activities with accomplices.
50
 So by searching the 
house for third parties, it is a reasonable and articulable fact that the arrestee’s 
accomplices might be in the home.
51
 Even so, police officers cannot “create 
circumstances warranting application of the search incident to arrest exception 
merely by bringing the arrestee near the items or areas they wish to search, or vice 
                                                                                                                                     
743 F.3d 1144 (8th Cir. 2014). Yet, the Court of Appeals of Minnesota is in the middle of this 
argument. Minnesota agrees with Buie but also adds that courts must look at the totality of the 
circumstances involved to see if the police officer had an objective basis for their suspicions. See 
State v. Bergerson, 671 N.W.2d 197 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).   
48
 See United States v. Fadul, 16 F. Supp. 3d 271, 280 (S.D.N.Y 2014). 
49
 See United States v. Barone, 721 F.Supp.2d 263, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).  
 
Six other state courts have affirmed Barone in regards to allowing police officers to conduct 
protective sweeps when officers have articulable facts that the house harbors dangerous third 
parties. See Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Construction and Application by State Courts of 
Protective Sweep Doctrine Recognized in Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 108 L. 
Ed. 2d 276 (1990)--Warrantless Search of House for Dangerous Persons, 78 A.L.R. 6th 297. 
Although, other state courts have also found this idea to be unconstitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment. Id.  
50
 See Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Construction and Application by State Courts of Protective 
Sweep Doctrine Recognized in Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276 
(1990)--Warrantless Search of House for Dangerous Persons, 78 A.L.R. 6th 297. 
51
 See Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Construction and Application by State Courts of Protective 
Sweep Doctrine Recognized in Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276 
(1990)--Warrantless Search of House for Dangerous Persons, 78 A.L.R. 6th 297.; and see also 
Moorer v. State, 286 Ga. App. 395, 649 S.E.2d 537 (2007); and People v. Maier, 226 Cal. App. 3d 
1670, 277 Cal. Rptr. 667 (4th Dist. 1991).  
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versa.”52  A search incident to an arrest is different from a warrantless protective 
sweep. This is due to the fact that the search incident to an arrest is conducted 
after someone is arrested. Whereas, a warrantless protective sweep can be done in 
any place where a police officer is and has reasonable suspicion that there could 
be harm. Therefore, a police officer can conduct a warrantless search whenever 
the officers feel they or other parties might be faced with harm.
53
 Furthermore, the 
police in a protective sweep cannot conduct a full search of a whole house or of a 
whole building. In a protective sweep, when the police are looking for third 
parties, they may only conduct a sweep that is no more than “a cursory inspection 
of those spaces where a person may be found.” 54 The reason why a warrantless 
protective sweep is more permissible in a search incident to an arrest is because 
the police officers want to stay safe from third parties who might harm the police 
officers, or others in the area.
55
 Police officers also want to make sure that the 
arrestee is kept away from objects that they could use to escape from the arrest or 
objects that they can use that could harm the officer, and the police officers want 
to find evidence that the prosecution can use in trial against the arrestee. 
56
 
                                                 
52
 See United States v. Barone, 721 F.Supp.2d 263, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
53
 Again, the police officers might have to fulfill other requirements in their than just feeling a 
threat from a third party. Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Construction and Application by State 
Courts of Protective Sweep Doctrine Recognized in Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 
1093, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276 (1990)--Warrantless Search of House for Dangerous Persons, 78 A.L.R. 
6th 297. 
54
 See United States v. Gould, 364 F.3d 580, 587 (5th Cir. 2004). 
55
 See Illya Lichtenberg, Article: The Dangers of Warrant Execution in a Suspect’s Home: Does 
An Empirical Justification Exist for the Protective Sweep Doctrine?, 54 Santa Clara L. Rev. 623, 
629-30 (2014). Also, this law review article explains that out of  seventy-six felonious killings, 
thirty-six (over half) have occurred during an execution of an arrest warrant. Therefore, police 
officers face a very intense situation when they execute an arrest warrant. Thus, protective sweeps 
are generally allowed when there is an incident to an arrest because society is protecting the police 
officers and themselves from serious harm. 
56
 See Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Construction and Application by State Courts of Protective 
Sweep Doctrine Recognized in Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276 
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Therefore, the police officer’s sweep can cover anything that the arrestee can grab 
before they are handcuffed and it can extend to inside a home if there is 
reasonable suspicion that the officer is in danger or that evidence might be 
destroyed by a third party.
57
  
 In 2011, the Court of Appeals of Ohio, Second Appellate District held that 
protective sweeps can be done even when the appellee is only detained and not 
arrested.
58
 Here, the court’s analysis is focused on the reasonableness of the 
exception to the warrant requirement.
59
 The court found that the officer had a 
reasonable belief criminal activity had occurred or was about to occur inside the 
house and therefore, the officer was justified to detain people in order to conduct 
a warrantless protective sweep.
60
 According to the facts of the case, the officers 
thought they saw a man put a gun in his waistband before the officers went into 
the house, and because of this, the officers were reasonable in detaining the 
suspects in the house and they were reasonable in searching every floor for the 
gun.
61
 The Second Appellate District also established that while conducting the 
protective sweep, if an officer finds evidence of a separate criminal act, under the 
                                                                                                                                     
(1990)--Warrantless Search of House for Dangerous Persons, 78 A.L.R. 6th 297. See also Illya 
Lichtenberg, Annotation, Article: The Dangers of Warrant Execution in a Suspect’s Home: Does 
An Empirical Justification Exist for the Protective Sweep Doctrine?, 54 Santa Clara L. Rev. 623, 
629-30 (2014).  
57
 See United States v. Barone, 721 F.Supp.2d 263, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
58
 See State v. Young, N.E. 1, 1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011). However many state courts have found that 
an arrest must happen if police officers want to take a warrantless protective sweep. See Ann K. 
Wooster, Annotation, Construction and Application by State Courts of Protective Sweep Doctrine 
Recognized in Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276 (1990)--
Warrantless Search of House for Dangerous Persons, 78 A.L.R. 6th 297. 
59
  See State v. Young, N.E. 1, 14 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011). 
60
 Id at 22.  
61
 Id at 4-8.  
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plain view doctrine the officers can confiscate the evidence and arrest the people 
for the crime.
62
 
  Additionally, the Florida Court of Appeals narrowed the definition of 
warrantless protective sweeps further by establishing that police officers cannot 
search a locked room during a protective sweep.
63
 The Florida Court of Appeals 
found this because there was a lack of exigent evidence that would have given the 
police officers authority to enter a locked room.
64
 The court acknowledged, 
however, that if there were no exigent evidence to gain access to a locked room, 
the police can obtain consent from the homeowner in order to enter the locked 
room.
65
 The court affirmed this rule from State v. Davile.
66
 According to Davile, 
the “police ‘cannot create the danger that becomes the basis for a protective 
sweep, but rather must be able to point to dangerous circumstances that developed 
once the officers were at the scene.’"67 Thus, without consent from the 
homeowner or exigent circumstances that can give rise to danger, police officers 
                                                 
62
 State v. Young, N.E. 1, 29 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011). 
 
Recently, the Ohio Second District Court has affirmed their opinion in two 2015 cases. In the one 
case a protective sweep was done due to the fact that the police had a reasonable suspicion that 
harm can come to them since the defendants fled from their car into their house, they would not let 
the police into the house after knocking, and once when the police were able to enter, they saw the 
two men and a toilet flushed which gave them the belief that they could be ambushed by a third 
party. State v. Lam, 2015 Ohio App. LEXIS 4201 at ¶ 16 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015). The second case 
where the Ohio District Court affirmed their 2011 ruling in State v. Young, was in State v. Koon, 
where the police received complaints about marijuana and when asked to go inside, the defendant 
let them in and upon conducting a protective sweep the police found marijuana and supplies to 
grow marijuana. From this the police detained the defendants inside of the house and waited for a 
warrant to conduct a search of the whole house. State v. Koon, 2015 Ohio App. LEXIS 1291 at ¶ 
17 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015).  
63
 See Hernandez v. State, 98 So.3d 703, 703 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
64
 Id at 708. 
65
 Id at 709.  
66
 Id at 708.  
67
 Id. 
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cannot enter a locked room when they are conducting a warrantless protective 
sweep.
68
 
 The Supreme Court of Kentucky in 2013 affirmed the ruling in United 
States v. Archibald
69, where the court narrowed Buie’s holding on requiring 
police to have an articulable basis on which to support their reasonable suspicion 
of danger from inside the home.
70
 An articulable basis means that the police have 
to be able to express the facts that clearly show that there is a reasonable basis for 
the police officer’s belief that the police or anyone else is in danger.71 The 
Kentucky Supreme court added that the “absence of information cannot be an 
articulable basis for a protective sweep that requires information to justify it in the 
first place.”72 Archibald argues that, this narrowed decision is based off of the 
idea that a standard for warrantless protective searches should not be made off of 
ignorance, where “police [can] stay ignorant as to whether or not anyone else is 
inside a house in order to conduct a protective sweep.”73 Therefore, the 
government has to meet its burden to demonstrate that there were “articulable 
facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would 
warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors 
an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.”74 
                                                 
68
 The Florida Criminal Procedure has incorporated this belief that police officers cannot enter a 
locked room during a warrantless protective sweep into their Criminal Defense Trial Manual. 1-2 
Florida Criminal Defense Trial Manual § 2.3 (2015).  
69
 See United States v. Archibald, 589 F.3d 291 (6th Cir. 2009).  
70
 Id.  
71
 Id at 300-01. 
72
 See Brumley v. Commonwealth, 413 S.W.3d 280, 287 (Ky. 2013).  
73
 See United States v. Archibald, 589 F.3d 291, 300 (6th Cir. 2009). 
74
 See United States v. Archibald, 589 F.3d 291, 301 (6th Cir. 2009). 
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 In 2014, a federal district court in New York affirmed Buie with regards to 
ensuring that a protective sweep is conducted "only when justified by a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion that the house is harboring a person posing a 
danger to those on the scene."
75
 The court affirmed the holding in Buie because 
they looked at the analysis in Payton
76
 with regards to the right to privacy 
integrated within the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
77
 This analysis 
in Payton was concerned with the Fourth Amendment ideal that there is a greater 
burden placed on officers who enter a home or dwelling without consent and this 
constitutional protection afforded to the individual’s interest in the privacy of his 
own home is equally applicable to a warrantless entry for the purpose of arresting 
a resident of the house. 
78
 Consequently, a protective sweep can be carried out 
only if there is a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the house is harboring a 
person posing a danger to those on the scene.
79
   
B. How the Court Looks at Warrantless Protective Sweeps Today 
                                                                                                                                     
The Michigan courts also agree with the sixth circuit that police must have an articulable basis for 
doing a warrantless protective sweep. Here, the police entered the house to conduct an arrest and 
on their way to retrieve a coat and shoes for the arrestee in the back bedroom on the same floor as 
they conducted the arrest on, the police saw in plain view a .22 caliber long rifle and a black rifle. 
The Michigan district court found that the protective sweep was reasonable based on the belief 
that the officers saw the guns in plain view and the officers then had a reasonable belief that they 
were in danger. See United States v. Abdulkadin, 880 F. Supp. 2d 779, 780 & 784-85 (2012).      
75
 See United States v. Fadul, 16 F. Supp.3d. 271, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).  
76
 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 574, 587 (2014).  
77
 See United States v. Fadul, 16 F. Supp.3d. 271, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
78
 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 574, 587-8 (2014). 
79
 Like the New York Federal District Court the Maine District Court agrees that a warrantless 
protective sweep can be conducted only if the police have a reasonable articulable suspicion that 
the house is harboring a person posing a danger to those on the scene. In this case, the police 
entered a small hotel room in which the police conducted a search because the person they were 
questioning had a background of drugs, firearms, and resisting arrest. The court found that the 
warrantless protective sweep was reasonable and constitutional since the defendant had this 
background and the police were able to articulate their fear with facts that the room was a confined 
space and the police knew that an unknown person was hiding behind the closed bathroom door. 
United States v. Henry, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147783, at 25-6 (D. Me. 2014).   
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 Today, there is a court split on how much of a search police officers can 
do in a warrantless protective sweep.
80
 Some of the courts, cite the Buie Court's 
definition of a protective sweep, which is “a quick and limited search of premises, 
incident to an arrest and conducted to protect the safety of police officers or 
others.”81 However, these courts have held strongly that the protective sweep 
doctrine does not apply to consent searches.
82
 These courts who cite Buie reason 
that a broader search would not be consistent with the balancing test implemented 
in the Fourth Amendment. 
83
 Again, this balancing test is the balance of an 
individual’s privacy interest against the promotion of legitimate governmental 
interests, such as protecting society from the harm of drugs.
84
 The Fourth 
Amendment balancing test is weighing the governmental interests against the 
privacy interests implemented in the Fourth Amendment.
85
 Here, the 
governmental interest is protecting officers from danger by the possibility of there 
being armed third parties in the house.
86
 The privacy interests implemented in the 
Fourth Amendment is the right that citizens have the right to privacy within their 
own home without governmental intrusion.
87
 By having a broader search, this 
“would enable and encourage [police] officers to obtain . . . consent as a pretext 
                                                 
80
 See United States v. Fadul, 16 F. Supp.3d. 271, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
81
 Id. 
82
 Id. 
83
 Id at 287. 
84
 See Cucuta v. New York City, 25 F. Supp.3d  404, 410 (S.D.N.Y 2014); See also Ann K. 
Wooster, Annotation, Construction and Application by State Courts of Protective Sweep Doctrine 
Recognized in Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276 (1990)--
Warrantless Search of House for Dangerous Persons, 78 A.L.R. 6th 297. 
85
 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 4, 20 (1968). 
86
 Id at 20-1. 
87
 Id. 
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for conducting a warrantless search of the home.
88
 This view also considers how 
police officers are not “compelled to enter,”89 but they choose to enter in spite of 
knowing the risks that they can face in doing so.
90
 Instead, officers could arrest 
people outside of the home, or officers can go into the house with more 
precaution because of these possibilities instead of searching or taking a 
warrantless protective sweep that includes the whole house.  
 However, “[o]ther courts have held the opposite, reasoning that when 
officers are lawfully present in a home pursuant to consent ‘circumstances can 
give rise to equally reasonable suspicion of equally serious risk of danger of 
officers being ambushed by a hidden person as would be the case were there an 
arrest.’"91 For example, there could be a situation like in United States v. Gandia, 
where police officers had obtained permission to enter the defendant’s apartment 
and upon entering in plain view saw a bullet.
92
 From this the officers conducted a 
warrantless protective sweep in order to protect their safety because they had a 
reasonable suspicion that a third party could be in the apartment. Another 
example is found in United States v. Holland, where officers had consent to enter 
an apartment and when they entered the apartment they saw a marijuana plant in 
                                                 
88 See United States v. Fadul, 16 F. Supp.3d. 271, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
89
 Id. 
90
 Id. 
91
 Id at 281.  
 
In Illya Lichtenberg’s Article: The Dangers of Warrant Execution in a Suspect’s Home: Does An 
Empirical Justification Exist for the Protective Sweep Doctrine?, She repeatedly discusses a 
statistic with seventy-six fatal incidents and out of these seventy-six incidents, sixteen of the 
incidents were ambushes which resulted in the deaths of sixteen police officers. Illya 
Lichtenberg’s Article: The Dangers of Warrant Execution in a Suspect’s Home: Does An 
Empirical Justification Exist for the Protective Sweep Doctrine?, 54 Santa Clara L. Rev. 623, 629-
30 (2014). 
92 See United States v. Gandia, 424 F.3d 257, 258 (2d Cir. 2005). 
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plain view.
93
 From this they had probable cause in believing that there was 
contraband in the apartment and that others might be hiding.
94
 For the officers 
safety they conducted a full protective sweep throughout the apartment.
95
 
Therefore, these courts argue that upon probable cause combined with exigent 
circumstances and the normal requirement that officers knock and announce 
themselves, this view can protect police officers when facts and circumstances 
can suggest that they might be at a serious risk of danger. 
IV. HOW A LIMITED SEARCH IS BETTER FOR SOCIETY 
AS A WHOLE 
 
a. A Reasonable Protective Sweep 
 Again, a limited sweep held in Buie is “a protective sweep as 'a quick and 
limited search of premises, incident to an arrest and conducted to protect the 
safety of police officers or others,' have held categorically that the doctrine does 
not apply to consent searches.”96 By implementing this rule established in Buie as 
a rule requiring certain elements to be needed in order for police officers to 
conduct warrantless protective sweeps, it will provide a minimal reasonable 
intrusion on people, it will protect police officers from harm, and it will stop the 
possibility of police misuse or abuse. First, the elements that police officers would 
need to satisfy in order to conduct a warrantless protective sweep include: (1) an 
arrest, (2) the arrest took place in the home that the officer wants to conduct the 
sweep in, and (3) the sweep is limited to the area where the arrestee can grab. 
Second, by making sure that the officer satisfies these three elements it will 
                                                 
93
 See United States v. Holland, 522 Fed. Appx. 268, 276 (6th Cir. 2013).  
94
 Id. 
95
 See United States v. Holland, 522 Fed. Appx. 268, 275-76 (6th Cir. 2013). 
96
 See United States v. Fadul, 16 F. Supp.3d. 271, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
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ensure that non-criminals, or innocent citizens, will not have an intrusion on their 
right to privacy. This guarantees that the arresting officer will be safe from harm 
committed by the arrestee, and it will make sure that the accused, or the 
arrestee’s, rights are protected as well.    
 By allowing a broader search, police officers can be more susceptible to 
misuse or abuse with the use of warrantless protective sweeps. This can be 
because the officers want to make sure no harm will come to them or others. One 
of the ways in which harm can come to the police officers is by third parties 
ambushing them when the officers are invited into someone’s home. If an accused 
or an accused’s relative believes that they were wronged and they want payback, 
then they can easily invite the officer into their home and have another person 
waiting for the officer so that they could kill or seriously harm them. Of course 
society sees people being seriously harmed or killed by others as a very bad thing. 
Yet, this is especially true with society not wanting police officers to be targeted. 
This is because police officers put their life in jeopardy every day for society, and 
people would not want to become police officers if police officers are being 
targeted. Thus, there would be no one in society to enforce and protect the laws, 
and everyone would be in danger.  Everyone would be in danger because harm 
can come to people in society through small and large criminal acts, such as 
selling and buying drugs, murder, and armed robbery. Therefore, police are 
needed to protect society to ensure that these criminal acts are not committed and 
society is kept from harm, and if these acts are committed, then the people who 
committed them will face punishment. Thus, by having a broader search of a 
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home in a warrantless protective sweep, the police can keep guns, drugs, and 
other illicit things off of the streets and keep society safe.  
 Not only can a broader approach to a warrantless protective sweep be used 
to protect society, but it can also ensure the guilty get punished for those crimes. 
This can be done by the police obtaining all of the evidence against the arrestee. 
By having more evidence the prosecution will be able to charge and find the 
suspects guilty of the crimes that they have committed. Therefore, this can help 
put away a lot more criminals in jail for the crimes that they commit and keep 
society safe from them. 
 However, this broader approach also means that innocent people will have 
their right to privacy violated. The violation could occur through mistake by the 
police officers, such as two people having the same name but living in two 
different towns. This could cause the innocent person to be subjected to their 
home and belongings being searched for no reason, and the guilty person to stay 
free and not being subjected to warrantless searches. This will create distrust 
among the citizens and the police, and the governmental system could be eroded 
by this distrust. Yet, mistake might not be the only problem to this broader 
approach of warrantless protective sweeps. The broader approach could facilitate 
misuse by the police. The police could conduct protective sweeps at homes in 
high crime areas to ensure that those people are really not criminals and not 
harming society.
97
 Or, this broader approach could create the police to abuse this 
                                                 
97
 The Supreme Court in Illinois v. Wardlow, has found that a high-crime area can be a 
determinative factor for a police officer with satisfying the reasonable suspicion requirement. So if 
the broader approach to a warrantless protective sweep is accepted, then police can use a high-
crime area and the belief that the home harbors a third party to gain reasonable suspicion and 
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exception to a warrant requirement.
98
 For instance, this could be done through the 
officer’s abuse of power because they do not like a specific person. When an 
officer does not like a specific person for any reason the officer can be susceptible 
to abuse of their police power. For example, the officer could conduct these 
searches on the person they do not like repeatedly for the belief that, that person 
could harm the officer or other people in society. Consequently, by implementing 
the limited search of a warrantless protective sweep a person’s right to privacy 
will be protected from the mistake, misuse, or abuse of police officers. Not only 
does the limited search of a warrantless protective sweep protect the rights of the 
people, but it also will protect the police officers from false accusations with 
regards to why they chose to do a warrantless protective sweep.   
 
                                                                                                                                     
therefore, they can conduct a warrantless protective sweep if they are in someone’s home. See 
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson and Damien Bernache, Article: The “High-Crime Area” Question: 
Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment Reasonable Suspicion 
Analysis, 57 Am. U.L. Rev. 1587, 1604. Another example, where police officers strategize on 
high-crime areas is in Minneapolis, Minnesota, where the “Hot Spots” program increases the 
number of police presence in the area to reduce criminal activity. They found this program to be 
effective. See Law enforcement: Policing Strategies, 
https://www.crimesolutions.gov/TopicDetails.aspx?ID=84 (last visited Jan. 14, 2016). Therefore, 
with a broader approach to warrantless protective sweeps, the police might abuse the sweeps in 
order to decrease crime, especially if they find the sweeps to be effective.  
98
 The police could discriminate based on racial profiling. If they enter a home of someone with a 
certain race, the officer might use the warrantless sweep more against that race than they would 
against a different race. Here, society can see this when the police officers stop, question, arrest, 
and search or investigates a person because the officer believes that members of that person’s 
racial or ethnic group are more likely than the population at large to commit the sort of crime that 
the officer is investigating. For example, after September 11, 2001, Arab Americans or people 
from Middle Eastern countries are believed to be prone to crime more than other racial or ethnic 
groups. See Samuel R. Gross and Katherine Y. Barnes, Article: Road Work: Racial Profiling and 
Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 651, 654-55 (2002). Another example is in 
New Jersey where the government investigated allegations of racial profiling on a New Jersey 
Turnpike. The court found “that 42% of stops and 73.2% of arrests were of blacks motorists, 
resulting in respective disparities of 16.35 and 54.2 standard deviations.” See David Rudovsky, 
Article: Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial Profiling and Stops and 
Searches without Cause, 3 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 296, 300 (2001). Therefore, it is easy to see that 
racial profiling could be a great concern to privacy if the broaden approach is the accepted way for 
warrantless protective sweeps.  
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b. Protecting the Police Officers 
 The limited search of a warrantless protective sweep will also protect 
police officers. This is because police officers will be able to conduct a minimal 
search in the area in which the arrestee is being arrested in. So that is the area in 
which the arrestee can reach for things. As a result, the police officer(s) will not 
have to worry for an ambush because the police officers will not have to ask for 
consent of the homeowner to enter the home, if there is a valid arrest taking place. 
Therefore, the potential arrestee or third parties will not have the time to set up an 
ambush. By implementing the limited search, it will protect police officers, 
society, and protect the privacy rights of citizens. Like the decision in Fadul, 
police officers do not have to enter a home if they have knowledge of the risks 
faced in doing so.
99
 The officers can conduct the arrest outside of the home, arrest 
someone at an arrestee’s job, or if the officers only want to question an individual, 
the officers can do so at the police station. 
100
 The police do not have to enter a 
home when they have no reason to. These measures will ensure the police 
officers’ safety while at the same time protect the right to privacy. 
  Yet, if the officers are still afraid for their safety by third parties when 
they are arresting someone, then they can have more officers with them to 
conduct an arrest. By having more officers at one time during one arrest, it can 
help prevent ambushes. This is because a larger group of police can scare away a 
third party and it will show all of the people involved that the police are taking the 
arrest or questioning very seriously. The police will want to do this because it 
                                                 
99
 See United States v. Fadul, 16 F. Supp.3d. 271, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
100
 See States v. Gandia, 424 F.3d 257, 263 (2005).  
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ensures that they will stay safe from harm and if there becomes too many arrests 
and the police cannot do this, then there could be a new unit or section open in the 
police force to have officers or trained workers to be able to conduct these arrests. 
Again, society will want to have more police officers if it means that society will 
stay safe, therefore, society will pay more in taxes or change funding from taxes 
to make sure that this happens.
101
 However, the officers still would have to make 
sure that they satisfy the three elements, (1) an arrest, (2) the arrest took place in 
the home that the officer wants to conduct the sweep in, and (3) the sweep is 
limited to the area where the arrestee can grab, to ensure that a proper limited 
warrantless protective sweep is being taken.
102
  
c. Obtaining a warrant 
 Yet, if there is a time when an officer observers something during an arrest 
inside of a home that gives them probable cause that a crime is taking place, the 
officer can obtain a search warrant in order to search the house.
103
 By reaffirming 
this warrant requirement from the Fourth Amendment, police officers will not 
have to worry about their actions becoming unreasonable and the police officers 
can obtain legal evidence that can be used in court. Overall, the limited search to a 
warrantless protective sweep will ensure that fairness is conducted by the police 
who follow the laws, and the citizens’ right to privacy will be protected. 
                                                 
101
 One can see this idea in education, where society will change funding for certain classes like 
the arts in order for the schools to have more teachers to teach students. Another example, can be 
seen in towns where the township will raise funding for a new park, in order for kids to be able to 
play in a safe area. 
102
 That in order to conduct a warrantless protective sweep under the limited approach theory 
police officers would have to satisfy that there was: (1) an arrest, (2) an arrest that took place in 
the home that the officer wants to conduct the sweep in, and (3) a sweep that is limited to the area 
where the arrestee can grab. 
103
 See Unreasonable Search and Seizure, Cornell University Law School (Sep. 12, 2015), 
available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/unreasonable_search_and_seizure. 
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Moreover, when the limited protective sweep is not enough, the police will be 
able to conduct a full search if probable cause is found by a neutral and detached 
magistrate
104
 who will review the facts to see if a reasonable person could find the 
search warranted
105, people’s right to privacy is ensured106, and police work is 
completed. 
V. CONCLUSION 
  The definition of a warrantless protective sweep has been changing over 
time, creating narrow and broad definitions of a sweep and when a sweep goes 
into the realm of a search for Fourth Amendment purposes. For instance, one of 
the first definitions of a warrantless protective sweep was found in Buie, by 
establishing that it is “a quick and limited search of premises, incident to an arrest 
and conducted to protect the safety of police officers or others.”107 Barone added 
to this definition with the rule that a protective sweep must have been supported 
by a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the area to be swept harbored an 
individual posing a danger to those on the scene.
108
 Then, the courts when on to 
say that, “the [ ] protective sweep [must] not have been ‘a full search’ but 
                                                 
104
 A long standing principle that probable cause must be determined by a “neutral and detached 
magistrate,” and not by “the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out 
crime.” Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 411, 413-17 (1969). See also, Johnson v. United States, 
333 U.S. 11, 13-4 (1948). 
105
 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 4, 22 (1968). 
106
 See Sherry F. Colb, ARTICLE: THE QUALITATIVE DIMENSION OF FOURTH 
AMENDMENT "REASONABLENESS", 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1642 (1998). 
107
 See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 327, 327 (1990).; See also: United States v. Miller, 430 F.3d 
94, 97 (2d Cir. 2005).  
 
Minnesota law also agrees with this idea, “[a] protective sweep search is limited and may extend 
only to a cursory inspection of those spaces where a person may be found.” 11 Dunnell Minn. 
Digest CRIMINAL LAW § 4.01. 
108
 See Hernandez v. State, 98 So.3d 703, 707 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).; See also: United States 
v. Barone, 721 F.Supp.2d 263, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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[instead] ‘a cursory inspection of those spaces where a person may be found.’”109 
Lastly, “the protective sweep must have lasted no longer than was necessary to 
dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger and no longer than the police were 
justified in remaining on the premises;” and “[t]he police must not have entered 
(or remained in) the home illegally and their presence within it must have been for 
a legitimate law enforcement purpose.”110 
 However, today the courts tend to look at protective sweeps in one of the 
two ways. Either what the Buie court established, with “a quick and limited 
search of premises, incident to an arrest and conducted to protect the safety of 
police officers or others.”111 Or, as other courts with the theory that when 
“officers are lawfully present in a home pursuant to consent circumstances can 
give rise to equally reasonable suspicion of equally serious risk of danger of 
officers being ambushed by a hidden person as would be the case were there an 
arrest.”112 
 Understanding the right to privacy that people have is essential to fully 
understand how a warrantless protective sweep can become an unreasonable 
intrusion onto someone’s right to privacy in their own home. However, to balance 
out the interests of the government and citizens, there can be an exception to the 
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. This exception that can keep the 
                                                 
109
 Id.; See also: United States v. Gould, 364 F.3d 580, 587 (5th Cir. 2004).  
110
 Id. 
 
Minnesota law also agrees with Hernandez that, “[t]he time frame of the search is also limited; it 
may last no longer than is necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger and in any event 
no longer than it takes to complete the arrest and depart the premises.” 11 Dunnell Minn. Digest 
CRIMINAL LAW § 4.01. 
111
 See United States v. Fadul, 16 F. Supp.3d. 271, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
112
 Id. 
Vol. 37.1 
 
303 
balance of the interests of the government and citizens is the warrantless 
protective sweep. A warrantless protective sweep provides police officers with 
protection from arrestee’s and third parties when an in-home arrest is conducted. 
However, a limited protective sweep with a satisfaction of a three element 
analysis
113
 will ensure the balance of the governmental interests and the right of 
privacy protected under the Fourth Amendment.  
 In order for this theory to work, the legislature or the court will have to 
implement ways for police officers to be accountable. This could be done through 
other officers checking on them when they are conducting an in-home arrest, or 
the legislature can create a statute that incorporates a search within an arrest 
warrant. However, currently, warrantless protective sweeps are too broad so there 
is room for error by police officers and this can create bigger intrusions on 
people’s right to privacy. Also, by not having accountability, the court cannot 
know which side of the story is correct.
114
 Another way the legislature and police 
department can solve this is by implementing cameras, recorders, or other tools to 
help society with understanding what happened during the arrest or search. This 
will make sure the protection of the citizens with their right to privacy, and this 
will ensure the protection of the police from serious risk of danger.  
                                                 
113
  As established in Section IV(A) of this paper, this three element analysis again is the elements 
that police officers would need to satisfy in order to conduct a limited warrantless protective 
sweep. Police officers must make sure that there is (1) an arrest, (2) the arrest took place in the 
home that the officer wants to conduct the sweep in, and (3) the sweep is limited to the area where 
the arrestee can grab.  
114
 An example where society uses accountability is with cameras in interrogation rooms. These 
cameras not only help defendants with proving if their miranda rights were waive properly, but the 
cameras also help the police with any questions of culpability. See Steven A. Derision and Beth A. 
Colgan, Article: Let the Cameras Roll: Mandatory Videotaping of Interrogations is the Solution to 
Illinois‘ Problem of False Confessions, 32 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 337, 363 (2001). Therefore, by having 
police accountable, it will lead to benefits all around. 
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 Thus, by implementing a limited search to the warrantless protective 
sweep this could guarantee that a citizen’s right to privacy is protected, police are 
kept safe, and if a bigger search was needed the police can obtain a search warrant 
from a neutral magistrate as established in the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution.   
